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In the absence of a post-meeting com-
munication, market participants looked
for consistent patterns in the behavior of
the Desk, from which they extracted
FOMC intentions. To minimize losses
associated with interest rate changes,
large commercial and investment banks
spent resources on “Fed watching”—a
practice largely necessary because of
limited communications by the FOMC. 
February 1994 marks the first milestone
in the development of better communi-
cation, when a post-meeting press
release stated:
…the Federal Open Market Committee
had decided to increase slightly the
degree of pressure on reserve positions.
The action was expected to be associ-
ated with a small increase in short-term
money market interest rates. 
The decision was taken to move toward
a less accommodative stance in mone-
tary policy to sustain and enhance the
economic expansion. 
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In February 1994, the FOMC began a
new era in transparency, gradually
building a communications apparatus
that conveys information about the
Committee’s decisions and expecta-
tions. Has the new apparatus
improved the public’s ability to pre-
dict FOMC interest rate decisions?
New research based on the prices of
fed funds futures shows that over the
past decade, it has, especially over
horizons of two to three months.
I guess I should warn you, if I turn out to
be particularly clear, you’ve probably
misunderstood what I’ve said.
Alan Greenspan
Former Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan is well known for his sly
sense of humor. The famous quote 
belies one of the greatest legacies of his
tenure—improved central bank commu-
nication and transparency. Under his
chairmanship, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) gradually devel-
oped an apparatus to clearly and openly
communicate its decisions and expecta-
tions. This communications apparatus is
largely—though not solely—character-
ized by the FOMC practice of releasing
a carefully crafted statement after each
meeting—a practice that will likely 
continue to evolve. 
Current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
recently emphasized the importance of
greater transparency and openness on
the part of the FOMC. He notes that in
the very short run, clear communication
improves the near-term predictability of
FOMC rate decisions, which in turn
reduces risk and volatility in financial
markets. Moreover, he argues that clear
communication enhances the effective-
ness of policy in the long run by helping
to align the expectations of financial
market participants more closely with
the FOMC’s own plans and projections.
The behavior of financial markets fol-
lowing the persistent series of rate hikes
that began in 2004 illustrates Chairman
Bernanke’s point. This period has been
characterized by low financial market
volatility, especially in U.S. Treasury
bond markets, and the remarkable abil-
ity of market participants to anticipate
FOMC policy moves. This behavior
contrasts sharply with that which 
followed a similar policy tightening
episode in 1994. With a communications
apparatus still in its infancy, bond mar-
kets were roiled by an inability to fully
anticipate 1994 FOMC policy moves. 
Below, we first briefly describe the key
milestones in the evolution of the FOMC
post-meeting statement. To assess
whether or not the changes in the state-
ment have improved near-term pre-
dictability of FOMC interest rate deci-
sions, we look at evidence based on
prices taken from the futures contract on
the overnight federal funds interest rate.
Over the past decade, these prices show
a dramatic increase in the ability of mar-
ket participants to predict future FOMC
decisions, especially over horizons of
two and three months. However, it is not
possible to conclude that all of the gains
in predictability are a direct result of
improved communications and, more
importantly, improved communication
does not rule out the possibility of large
surprises in future FOMC rate changes. 
■ The Evolving Apparatus
It is useful to recall how vaguely FOMC
policy decisions were once communi-
cated to the public. In the early 1990s, for
example, no systematic post-meeting
statements were issued. After FOMC
meetings, the intended level, or target, of
the federal funds rate that had been cho-
sen by the voting members was conveyed
in a directive to the Trading Desk at the
New York Fed, much as it is done today.
The Desk in turn conducted daily open
market operations in a manner that would
achieve the fed funds target on average
over an intermeeting period. But market
participants learned about intended fed
funds rate changes only by inferring them
from the actions of the Trading Desk. improved communications outweighed
negligible or even nonexistent costs.
After the July 1995 meeting, the FOMC
statement explicitly reported the fed
funds rate target.
It is important to stress that these initial
statements conveyed no sense of the
FOMC’s expectation for future policy.
Between February 1994 and February
1995, financial markets were quite
volatile. Bond prices fell dramatically,
suggesting that bond market participants
failed to anticipate the near-term course
of policy. Noteworthy as the initial com-
munications effort was, much was yet to
be learned by doing. Cleveland Fed
President Sandra Pianalto describes 
this time as a period during which the
FOMC “learned to talk.”
In May 1999 another key milestone was
reached when the Committee began to
provide a more elaborate post-meeting
statement that included both the rationale
for the decision and some sense of the
expected direction of the future path of
policy. After that point, the FOMC issued
a statement whether policy was changed
or not. With these innovations, the basic
elements of the statement, as it appears
today, were largely in place. Most
recently, forward-looking language has
become more explicit, with the Commit-
tee using phrases such as “considerable
period” and “measured pace.”
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FIGURE 3 AVERAGE 
ABSOLUTE ERROR
NOTES: Because prices for fed funds futures contracts are based on averages of the daily fed funds rate for the month a contract expires, these prices
will reflect two possibly different targets when an FOMC meeting falls within the month of the contract. These figures use data from only “clean” con-
tracts—those which had no scheduled FOMC meeting within the contract month.  Half the FOMC meetings are associated with such clean contracts.
Shaded bars represent recessions.
SOURCES: Chicago Board of Trade and authors’calculations.
FIGURE 2 PREDICTION ERROR: 
90 DAYS AHEAD OF 
FOMC MEETING
Chairman Greenspan decided to
announce this action immediately so
as to avoid any misunderstanding of
the Committee's purposes, given the
fact that this was the first firming of
reserve market conditions by the
Committee since early 1989. 
The markets understood this to be a
signal that the target fed funds rate
had been increased 25 basis points.
The transcripts of the February meet-
ing and those just prior to it reveal an
extensive debate about the benefits and
potential costs of policy transparency.
The intended federal funds rate had
been unchanged for more than a year,
and some members of the FOMC were
concerned that the first in a likely
series of rate hikes would catch finan-
cial markets by surprise. The chair-
man’s statement was meant to limit
that surprise, and as it did, it also broke
new ground, becoming the first step in
the development of the communica-
tions apparatus. 
The FOMC continued its practice of
issuing a post-meeting statement but
only when the target rate was changed.
Unchanged policy was revealed by the
absence of a statement, and the actual
target rate was never specified.
Between 1995 and 1999 the FOMC
moved toward more explicit and regu-
lar statements, as the benefits of
■ Near-Term Policy 
Predictability
Gauging the impact of the improve-
ments in FOMC communications
requires a measure of market partici-
pants’expectations for future FOMC
decisions. Fed funds futures, intro-
duced in October 1988, quickly gained
attention as a useful instrument for 
predicting future FOMC rate decisions.
Figure 1 illustrates both the level of the
fed funds target and its predicted value
based on the futures price observed 90
days ahead of FOMC meetings from
1989 through early 2006. The predic-
tion errors are presented in figure 2.
Casual inspection reveals that over the
sample period, the futures-based fore-
cast predicts the actual target rate rea-
sonably well, although it is biased in
the sense that it is often above the
actual target rate. Over the entire sam-
ple, the implied yield tends to overpre-
dict the actual target by 16 basis points
on average. Of course, if a predictor is
biased, and the bias is constant over
time, one would want to adjust the 
prediction to account for the bias. 
It is often found that futures are biased
predictors. The bias may reflect a small
risk or term premium, which tends to
become larger the longer the forecast
horizon is. Such a premium would
result, for example, if buyers of thefutures contract had to offer a higher
than expected interest rate in order to
lock in a fixed rate at which they could
borrow. 
Other factors could also help explain
overprediction in our sample period. 
A surge in productivity in the 1990s
produced an unanticipated disinflation
over most of the period depicted in 
figure 1. With gains in productivity that
were not matched by gains in wages,
inflation almost always came in below
expectations, implying that market par-
ticipants continually expected the
FOMC to run a tighter monetary policy
than was actually necessary. The bias
could also reflect a lack of depth and
liquidity in the fed funds futures mar-
ket, especially in the earlier part of the
sample, in which case, prices would not
fully reflect all information. 
Figure 3 illustrates the means of
absolute prediction errors for each day
before an FOMC meeting for two seg-
ments of the sample period. Although
the evidence suggests that better com-
munications have improved near-term
policy predictability, we cannot, of
course, rule out the possibility that the
recent smaller prediction errors also
reflect the end of the unanticipated
deflation, possible market deepening
over the period, or a decline in the risk
premium. All of these possibilities
would imply a reduction in absolute
prediction error. 
A more detailed analysis of prediction
errors provides a stronger case for the
effectiveness of the enhanced commu-
nications policy. Figure 4 shows the pre-
diction errors over time for three alter-
native horizons. 
It is especially instructive to compare
errors for the year following February
1994 with those for the year following
June 2004. Both are periods during
which interest rates began to rise after
being unchanged for more than a year. In
the first instance, the communications
apparatus was only just being developed.
Thus, the FOMC had a limited means 
to offer any guidance about near-term
policy intentions. The prediction errors
following the change in policy direction
were clearly higher in the earlier period at
all horizons but especially within the
intermeeting period (30 days ahead). 
The evidence is uniformly supportive of
the benefits of improved communica-
tion and is consistent with the analysis
of Poole (2005), who examines changes
in futures prices on the day of FOMC
meetings, and the analysis of Lange,
Sack, and Whitesell (2003), who exam-
ine changes before and after 1994. All
of this work suggests that the construc-
tion of the FOMC’s communication
apparatus has enhanced the predictabil-
ity of monetary policy.
■ An Important Caveat
It is clearly constructive to provide
information that helps to align the
expectations of market participants with
those of the FOMC when the Commit-
tee can predict both its plans and out-
comes with reasonable accuracy. But
does improved communication lead to
more effective policy when both the
plans of policymakers and the conse-
quences of FOMC actions are not pre-
dictable? Has the experience since
2004 been only serendipity?
Figure 4 reveals that some policy
actions after 1999 were not very pre-
dictable. Errors were high in the
months in and around the two reces-
sionary periods in the sample. The third
panel of figure 4 highlights the obser-
vation that the January 2001 rate cuts
came as a surprise, indicating an error
of about 80 basis points around the end
of December 2000. At that time, a rate
cut of about 25 basis points seemed
likely. It is important to stress here that
although the both timing and magni-
tude of the rate cuts were not fully
anticipated, the surprise appears justi-
fied after the fact. Note that the fed
funds rate target was cut in two 50-
basis-point increments in January
2001—at least three months ahead of
the April decline in employment (and
subsequent dating of March as the busi-
ness cycle peak).
It is perhaps not surprising that the
greatest prediction errors would occur
prior to the onset of a recession. Such
turning points are notoriously difficult
to predict. Documenting the gains in
predictability brought about by an
improved communications policy is not
meant to suggest that future policy will
be perfectly anticipated. Clearly,
shocks to the economy cannot be antic-
ipated, meaning that policy responses
to the shocks cannot be anticipated.
However, aside from such turning
points, it does appear that market 
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participants have a much improved
understanding of the intentions of the
FOMC, as evidenced by the remarkably
small prediction errors over the past 
two years. 
■ Recommended Readings
Ben S. Bernanke. 2004. “Central Bank
Talk and Monetary Policy,” Remarks at
Japan Society Corporate Luncheon,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, October.  
Refet Gurkaynak, Brian P. Sack, and
Eric Swanson. 2006. “Market-Based
Measures of Monetary Policy,” Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, work-
ing paper 2006-04.
Joe Lange, Brian P. Sack, and William
Whitesell. 2003. “Anticipations of Mon-
etary Policy in Financial Markets.”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
vol. 35, no. 6.  
Donald L. Kohn, and Brian P. Sack.
“Central Bank Talk: Does It Matter and
Why?” Finance and Economics Discus-
sion Series 2003-55. Washington: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (August).
Ken Kuttner. 2001. “Monetary Policy
Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence
from the Fed Funds Futures Market,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
47, no. 3, pp. 523–44.
Sandra Pianalto. 2005. “Expectations,
Communications, and Monetary Policy.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary (April 15).
Monika Piazzesi, and Eric Swanson.
2004. “Futures Prices as Risk-Adjusted
Forecasts of Monetary Policy.” National
Bureau of Economic Research working
paper, no. 10547.
William Poole. 2005. “How Predictable
Is Fed Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, Review, vol.87, no. 6, pp.
659–68. 
Vincent Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack.
2005. “Grading the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee’s Communications,”
unpublished manuscript.